Opinion: What’s Fueling the Pakistan–Afghanistan Conflict? Islamabad’s Relentless Cycle of Insecurity Explained

Following Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi’s visit to New Delhi last year, Islamabad’s accusation that Kabul is becoming a “India colony” was intensified. What’s Fueling the Pakistan–Afghanistan Conflict? Islamabad’s Relentless Cycle of Insecurity Explained

Along the disputed Durand Line, long-simmering tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan have suddenly erupted into open conflict. Direct state-to-state enmity is, at least temporarily, reshaping what was formerly a theater of proxy warfare. Pakistan claimed to be targeting Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS-K members when it launched airstrikes on purported militant sanctuaries in Nangarhar, Paktika, and Khost on February 21. On February 26, Kabul retaliated by launching ground assaults against Pakistani troops in six provinces. Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said that Pakistan’s “cup of patience has overflowed” as Islamabad intensified “Operation Ghazab Lil Haq,” hitting targets in Kabul and Kandahar.

Islamabad says 274 Taliban fighters have been killed and 12 soldiers have been lost, while Kabul says 55 Pakistani soldiers have been killed and 13 of its own fighters have been slain. The death toll is still up for debate and cannot be verified. Beyond the figures, however, is a more significant reality: a frontier that is structurally unstable has reached a new and potentially hazardous phase.

Durand and Its Dissatisfaction
There is more to the crisis than just sporadic acts of violence. The Durand Line, a 2,600-kilometer border created in 1893 that was never formally acknowledged by subsequent Afghan governments, is the source of this unsolved issue. A historical grievance is incorporated into the geography of the contemporary state system by the border that divides Pashtun tribal territory.

In 2021, when the Taliban regained power, Pakistan first expected strategic benefits. Kabul was supposed to rein in the TTP, whose ideological similarities to the Afghan Taliban are widely known. Rather, TTP attacks grew more intense, and in 2025 alone, more than 2,400 Pakistani security officers were reportedly murdered, the most in ten years. The idea that its long-standing influence over the Taliban has diminished is another factor contributing to Islamabad’s annoyance, in addition to security setbacks.

The immediate triggers were recent attacks in Islamabad, Bajaur, and Bannu, which Pakistan blamed on militants headquartered in Afghanistan. In October 2025, ceasefire attempts mediated by regional actors failed due to ongoing fighting. The Taliban’s hesitation to take on the TTP is a result of both their realistic concern of internal disintegration, including defections to ISIS-K, and their shared Pashtun allegiance.

A geopolitical recalibration is layered on top of these conflicts. When Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited New Delhi last year and issued a joint statement denouncing regional terrorism, Islamabad’s accusation that Kabul is turning into a “India colony” became even more pointed. This diplomatic thaw between Kabul and New Delhi is not just a show for Pakistan; it might be a strategic encirclement. Thus, the latest escalation seems to be both a counterterrorism operation and a coercive signal.

This War Is Won by No One
There are urgent humanitarian and economic repercussions. While Pakistan gains income and strategic depth from its western corridor, Afghanistan continues to rely significantly on Pakistani ports for transit trade. Economic activity in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa might be paralyzed by border closures. There is growing uncertainty around flagship connectivity projects, such as the TAPI gas pipeline and larger Eurasian transit ventures. If militancy spreads, China’s investments in Pakistan, especially under the CPEC, may face increased security risks.

However, a full-scale conventional conflict is still unlikely. Pakistan cannot afford a lengthy two-front scenario, while Afghanistan lacks conventional depth and airpower. Therefore, even if tactical brinkmanship continues, the logic of escalation is constrained by structural factors.

India’s Position
The crisis presents India with both opportunities and risks. Afghanistan’s sovereignty has been emphasized in New Delhi’s public message, while Pakistan has been criticized for externalizing its shortcomings in domestic security. This is consistent with India’s strategic outreach to the Taliban, which focuses on projects like the Chabahar corridor, trade facilitation, and humanitarian aid.

Distracted Pakistan might reduce immediate pressure over India’s western border and weaken Islamabad’s ability to move across the area. However, there are spillover dangers associated with Afghanistan’s instability, such as extremist mobilization, challenges to Indian development initiatives, and disruptions to India’s aspirations for connectivity with Central Asia. It is reasonable to interpret Pakistan’s escalation as an effort to stop Kabul from intensifying its relations with New Delhi. Long-term India-Taliban relations may eventually limit Pakistan’s diplomatic options.

Put an End to Pretences
A fundamental change from debatable intermediaries to direct confrontation is evident in the current crisis. It is likely that a tactical de-escalation will occur, perhaps with regional mediation. But the boundary will continue volatile unless fundamental issues—the Durand Line dispute, TTP sanctuaries, and the larger struggle for regional influence—are resolved.

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for Pakistan, the clear takeaway from this most recent flare-up is that it can no longer afford the strategic ambivalence that has characterized its Afghan strategy for many years. Coercive signaling, episodic airstrikes, or the routine externalization of internal failures will not fix security issues that have their roots in history and identity. Islamabad will continue to be caught in a vicious circle of insecurity that it created as long as it vacillates between punitive retaliation and tactical accommodation.

Pakistan needs to completely rethink its strategy if it hopes to achieve stability on its western border. This includes putting money into long-term political engagement with Kabul, tackling the structural causes of radicalization within its own borders, and giving up the logic of selective militancy. Credible pledges and regional cooperation will produce long-lasting security, not inventing deterrence narratives or controlling proxies. Therefore, in order for a true regional equilibrium to emerge, Islamabad must engage in introspection as well as de-escalation.

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