Following over two decades of bipartisan efforts to strengthen the relationship between New Delhi and Washington, including progress made during his own first term, U.S. President Donald Trump is now working to undermine this carefully cultivated partnership.
In recent weeks, the administration has:
- Suspended trade negotiations with India and announced, through a social media post, a baseline 25 percent tariff, while granting China another extension—a stark contrast between a “friend” and a rival that hasn’t gone unnoticed in New Delhi.
- Declared on August 4 an increase in the 25 percent tariff and additional penalties for India’s oil purchases from Russia. In New Delhi, this is viewed as blunt coercion and significant interference in India’s foreign policy, especially considering India’s oil import needs, and as a cynical move to “blame India” for the West’s, including Trump’s, failure to persuade Moscow to halt its war on Ukraine.
- Threatened additional tariffs on India for its involvement in the BRICS alliance with Brazil, China, Russia, South Africa, among others. New Delhi unsurprisingly perceives this as further interference and coercion.
- Criticized and threatened U.S. companies manufacturing in India—a central element of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s agenda—while urging them to invest in the United States instead, or face financial penalties. This highlights the contradiction between Trump’s “America First” and Modi’s “Make in India” initiatives.
- Socialized with Pakistan’s Army chief at the White House shortly after a terrorist attack on India, while awarding Islamabad a favorable tariff rate of just 19 percent and promising to jointly explore Pakistan’s oil reserves.
- Continued to promote a new form of American technonationalism, where sharing technology with foreign nations is treated with suspicion. Some advisors around the president favor keeping American technology domestic, limiting exports, and reducing co-innovation efforts with international partners.
It is undoubtedly tempting to overlook Trump’s threats against India, and seasoned experts are doing so for five reasons:
First, as former assistant commerce secretary Ray Vickery has noted, the president tends to bluster before negotiating deals, suggesting that eventually a “trade deal” under Trump could lower India’s 25 percent baseline tariff rate.
Second, as emphasized by my Carnegie colleague Rudra Chaudhuri, the network of commercial, technological, and societal connections between Americans and Indians extends beyond Trump. This includes billions in mutual investments, numerous tech collaborations, and tens of thousands of Indian and American engineers and venture capitalists actively engaging with one another.
Third, as leading strategic affairs analyst C. Raja Mohan points out, India requires structural reforms, and Trump’s tough tactics might even serve as a catalyst for India to make necessary adjustments.
Fourth, according to Walter Russell Mead of the Hudson Institute, there are persistent challenges, or “pain points,” that have historically caused friction and created obstacles to cooperation, even under favorable conditions.
Finally, in practical terms, geopolitical threats remain significant, and the shared concerns highlighted by Secretary of State Marco Rubio about China’s growing influence will inevitably lead to some level of strategic alignment.
However, these considerations overlook two key realities: domestic politics almost always outweighs foreign policy, and foreign policy arguments rarely succeed unless supported by a robust domestic political base.
The commercial, technological, and societal ties between the United States and China became far more extensive than those with India. Yet, after four decades of rapid growth and deep connections, these ties quickly unraveled within a few short years due to shifting strategic priorities and altered domestic politics.
Notably, for the first time in two decades, Trump’s actions, statements, and coercive approach have turned relations with the United States into a volatile domestic political issue in India. The opposition, media, and Indian public are urging the government to resist showing weakness in response to Trump’s threats.
With a significant portion of the American electorate seemingly willing to follow Trump’s lead, it may only be a matter of time before U.S.-India relations become a contentious issue in American domestic politics as well. Topics directly impacting India rank among the most partisan and controversial in Washington, such as immigration and deportation, H1B visas for tech workers, offshoring and overseas manufacturing by U.S. companies, and technology sharing and co-innovation with international partners.
This situation does not bode well for the next two decades of U.S.-India relations, as one of the major achievements since the early 2000s has been overcoming domestic politics and partisanship.
As the former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for U.S.-India ties at the conclusion of President George W. Bush’s administration, I can personally attest that it required tremendous effort from numerous individuals in both countries to transcend partisanship, politicization, and historical barriers. In fact, the last time domestic politics almost completely derailed the transformation of U.S.-India relations was during this period.
In July 2008, after three years of delays regarding a landmark 2005 civil nuclear agreement with Washington, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh nearly lost a no-confidence vote when the Left Front, which supported the government externally, withdrew its backing over the deal. Indian politics became fractured, with parties that had traditionally advocated for closer U.S.-India ties ironically voting against the government to topple it. Singh survived, and the deal progressed—thanks largely to the support from parties outside the UPA coalition, like the Samajwadi Party, a regional party influential in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh.
Today, few of those who enthusiastically promote the U.S.-India strategic partnership remember how narrowly the nuclear deal avoided collapse. However, two lessons are evident: once domestic politics intervenes, good intentions and ideas can falter; and trust is difficult to establish, even more challenging to maintain, and most difficult to rebuild once it dissipates amid political entanglement.
U.S.-India relations could now turn into a political football, particularly in New Delhi, putting at risk the core understandings that facilitated closer ties between the two nations.
First, New Delhi largely assumed that Washington would take political risks to bolster the relationship, but Trump has not and clearly will not.
Second, although the United States and India often disagree on Pakistan, Washington had previously been attentive to New Delhi’s concerns, striving to shape U.S. policies accordingly. Trump’s lavish praise for Islamabad and his deals with Pakistan’s military and government have now heightened concerns in New Delhi, especially since these actions came shortly after the terrorist attack on April 22 that killed twenty-six Indian civilians in Pahalgam and led to renewed hostilities between the two countries.
Third, both capitals historically mistrusted each other’s intentions with third parties but learned not to let this hinder closer relations. New Delhi worried about Washington’s dealings with Beijing and Islamabad, while the United States was troubled by India’s connections with Iran, Myanmar, and later Russia. Now, Trump and his administration are imposing sanctions and tariffs on India over its oil trade with Russia, significantly altering the expectations for bilateral relations.
Fourth, despite longstanding mistrust, both sides have typically moderated their language and tone. Trump has taken a different approach, criticizing India and even labeling it a “dead economy.”
Fifth, and most crucially, leaders from both nations and all major political parties worked hard to secure a bipartisan foundation. It is therefore ironic that the Congress Party, which championed the 2005 nuclear deal with Washington, is now leading criticism of U.S.-India relations in New Delhi, while Bush’s Republican successor in the White House criticizes India almost daily on social media.
For those who believe America and India stand to gain much and lose even more if ties rupture, the repoliticization of U.S.-India relations represents a slow-motion catastrophe.
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